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Abstract
Assessing the vulnerability of physical protection systems (PPS) in nuclear medicine facilities is needed
to prevent a security incident that could lead to the malicious use of nuclear material. Theft and sabotage
of nuclear materials is becoming globally recognized. The current methods of assessing vulnerability
tend to be oriented toward complex nuclear security; consequently, it is excessive to use such methods in
simple facilities (i.e., radiotherapy facilities in hospitals).
The fault tree analysis is a method to assess vulnerability for a simple nuclear facility. The method’s
primary events (i.e., basic events and undeveloped events) are able to accommodate fault causes that
result from threats.
The implementation of this new evaluation method for a radiotherapy facility using Cobalt-60 (Co-60) in
Sardjito Hospital shows that its PPS are vulnerable; the threat of interrupting the electrical supply lines
make the detection functions fail.
Keywords: physical protection system (PPS), vulnerability, methods, modification

I.

Introduction

Nuclear materials are being stolen from nuclear facilities. Radiation sources from Caesium-137 (Cs-137)
were stolen in Brazil in 1987; six people died and 20 others suffered radiological damage, as well as other
radiation-related issues. Some hospitals in Indonesia use nuclear radiation for medical services, which
means that malicious attacks are a possibility in the future. Nuclear security has become a national
concern for Indonesia. Consequently, a physical protection system (PPS) is always implemented in
nuclear facilities and nuclear medical facilities.
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Understanding the susceptibility of a PPS in a nuclear medical facility is important. The existing methods
of assessing the vulnerability of a PPS tend to be implemented in complex nuclear facilities. However, not
many methods that analyze vulnerability for simple nuclear facilities such as nuclear medical facilities
exist. Thus, a simple method to analyze vulnerability needs to be developed.
The fault tree analysis learns from an undesired event in system levels and relates event to its causes in
component levels, which provides an opportunity to include security threats. Finding a modified fault tree
method of analysis for analyzing the vulnerability of a PPS is the topic of this research.

II.

Method

Fault tree analysis is a deductive failure analysis that focuses on one particular undesired event and
provides a method for determining the causes of that event. The undesired event appears as the top
section in a fault tree diagram constructed for the system, and generally consists of a complete or
catastrophic failure [1]. This top event is then deduced using a binary system to arrive at the primary
event. Some intermediate events are possible between the top event and the primary event. These
intermediate events are fault events that occur because of one or more antecedents’ causes act through
logic gates. Finally, the primary event is the event for one reason or another that has not been further
developed. There are four events in the category of primary event (i.e., basic, undeveloped, conditional,
and external).
The two important events in this occasion are a basic event and an undeveloped event. The basic event is
the event, which does not to be developed further, while the undeveloped event is the event in which
further development is unavailable, possibly because it is external to the system.
The basic designed structure or hierarchy of events in a fault tree analysis/diagram is shown below:

a)

Basic event structure for AND gate

Figure 1. Basic event structure of fault tree analysis
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The basic event and undeveloped event may be explored in order to understand their characteristics based
on the question, “is there any opportunity to put a deliberate and malicious action (security threat) within
it?” The developed method modifies the basic event structure (Fig. 1) in its primary event. The result is
shown below:

a) Modified basic event structure for AND gate

Figure 2. Modified basic event structure of fault tree analysis.
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The natural basic event (NBE) is a basic event that occurs naturally (i.e. the technical failure of
component functions). Meanwhile, the deliberate basic event is the failure of component functions that
occur deliberately (a threat). The natural undeveloped event is an event that is not naturally developed. In
addition, the deliberate undeveloped event is an event that has a nature of deliberate occurrence
(deliberately interrupting the power supply).
Modifying the primary event in a fault tree analysis enriches the capability of this method to include any
deliberate action (a security threat).

III. Result
Using the modified fault tree to analyze the PPS of radiotherapy facilities, Sardjito General Hospital
shows that its detection system is highly vulnerable. The fault tree diagram produced is shown below.
The security incident will occur if detection functions fail, if functions are delayed, or if there are
response functions. The analysis is focused on a detection function because it consists of equipment and
human action.

Figure 3. Modified fault tree diagram for the PPS of the Sardjito General Hospital's Radiotherapy Facility.

IV. Discussion
Overall, the result shows that the modified fault tree analysis is able to include the security threat as part
of its primary event. The diagram demonstrates that the detection function will fail because of three
causes; every cause is able to fail the detection function (OR logic). The threat may affect power supplies
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and equipment failures. The malicious act may interrupt the power supply deliberately, as well as destruct
the alarm equipment. If one of these threats occurs, the detection function fails directly. This means the
PPS is highly vulnerable to security incidents.
There are two possible results regarding security threats. The first is that the threat becomes a single
cause, which is able to fail the system function; this case is given in the result of the implementation (Fig.
3). If it is assumed that the probability of threat occurrence is one that means that any threat will always
succeed. Consequently, the PPS is highly vulnerable and must be redesigned.
The second possibility is that the cause of the top event is an “AND combination” of threats and
component failures. Using the similar assumption that the probability of a threat is one, the probability of
the combination of threats and component failures is the probability of component failures.

V.

Conclusion

The result shows that the fault tree analysis may be modified to provide a method of vulnerability
evaluation for a PPS in a simple nuclear facility. The criteria used for evaluation are inherently provided
by the method; there are only two vulnerability states that are highly vulnerable or similar to the failure
probability of the hardware system of the PPS.
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